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Abstract. Anonymity is one of the main concerns in group-oriented
cryptography. However, most efforts, for instance, group signatures and
ring signatures, are only made to provide anonymity on the sender’s side.
There are merely few works done to ensure anonymity in a cryptographic
sense on the recipient’s side in group-oriented communications. This pa-
per formalizes the notion of group decryption (GD). It can be viewed as
an analog of group signatures in the context of public key encryptions. In
this notion, a sender can encrypt a committed message intended to any
member of a group, managed by a group manager, while the recipient
of the ciphertext remains anonymous. The sender can convince a veri-
fier about this fact without leaking the plaintext or the identity of the
recipient. If required, the group manager can verifiably open the iden-
tity of the recipient. We propose an efficient GD scheme that is proven
secure in the random oracle model. The overhead in both computation
and communication is independent of the group size. A full ciphertext is
about 0.2K bytes in a typical implementation and the scheme is practical.
Keywords: Group-oriented cryptography, Group decryption, Bilinear
pairing, Anonymity.
1 Introduction
Anonymity is the main concern in group-oriented cryptography. It has attracted
a lot of attentions in the context of digital signatures and been extensively
studied in the literature, such as group signatures [8], ring signatures [17],
etc. However, these types of anonymous signatures only provide anonymity on
the sender’s side in the communication. Few works have been done to ensure
anonymity on the recipient’s side using cryptographic primitives.
M. Yung, P. Liu, and D. Lin (Eds.): Inscrypt 2008, LNCS 5487, pp. 72–83, 2009.
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There exist applications where the recipients’ anonymity is useful. For in-
stance, in a privacy enhanced optimistic fair exchange scenario, two parties ex-
changing the secrets may not want to reveal their identities to the third party.
This notion may also be useful in identity escrow and transactions over the In-
ternet. In [11], Kiayias et al. illustrated other examples of recipient anonymity
such as anonymous trusted third party escrow, secure oblivious retriever storage
and ad hoc access structure group signature. This paper concentrates on the
identity privacy of recipients in group-oriented public key encryption.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we formalize the notion of group decryption, in which a sender can
verifiably send a message to a receiver in a group. The identity of the receiver
is kept anonymous to any one except the group manager who can convincingly
trace the intended receiver in the case of dispute.
We explain our basic ideas here. First, we let the sender commit the message to
be sent. Before encrypting the message, the sender also randomizes the receiver’s
public key and the corresponding certificate, such that the randomized public
key corresponds to the same secret key as the original one. Furthermore, any one
can verify that the randomized certificate is still a signature of the randomized
public key, but no one can link them with the original public key and certificate
except the intended receiver and the group manager. Then the sender encrypts
the message using the randomized public key of some group member. Finally,
the sender just proves that the last encryption operation takes the committed
message as input and the intended receiver can use its original secret key to
decrypt it. For a practical implementation, we have to find proper encryption
schemes and methods to generate the receiver’s public keys and their certificates
allowing repeated randomization. More specifically, our contribution includes the
following aspects.
– Model and security definitions. We formalize the notion of the group decryp-
tion. It can be viewed as an analog of group signatures in the context of
public key encryptions. In this notion, a sender can encrypt a committed
message to any intended group member managed by a group manager while
the recipient of the ciphertext remains anonymous. The sender can convince
a verifier about this fact without leaking the plaintext or the identity of the
recipient. If required, the group manager can verifiably open the identity of
the recipient.
– Efficient implementation. We design our scheme with the original ElGamal
encryption in the context of pairing groups and the CL+-signature [1,2] to
generate the certificates of the group members’ public keys. The scheme is
proven semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attackers in the random
oracle model [5]. The overhead in both computation and communication is
independent of the group size and the scheme is practical.
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1.2 Related Work
In [12,13,14], a similar notion of custodian-hiding verifiable encryption was pre-
sented. A sender can verifiably encrypt a message using a chosen public key from
a public key list but the intended recipient is anonymous. There is no group man-
ager to administer the potential recipients. Their notion is designed for ad-hoc
applications and each ciphertext has to contain the public key list of potential
recipients. Their instantiations suffer from a linear cost in both communication
and computation in addition to the public key list in each ciphertext. In the case
of dispute, no group manager can revoke the anonymity of the receiver.
More recently, Kiayias et al. [11] independently presented a primitive referred
to as group encryption and an efficient instantiation achieving the security goals
similar to ours. Their basic idea is to let the sender first commit the message to be
sent. Then the sender encrypts the message using the intended receiver’s public
key. The sender also encrypts the receiver’s public key as well as the associated
certificate from the group manager using the open manager’s public key. Finally,
the sender proves to a verifier that it has behaved honestly in a zero-knowledge
manner. For a practical implementation, proper underlying encryption schemes
have to be found to enable an easy zero-knowledge proof. They realize a scheme
with a cramer-shoup variation of the Paillier cryptosystem and obtain a CCA-
2 secure scheme without using random oracles. The zero-knowledge proof is
interactive. It can be converted into a non-interactive one using the Fiat-Shamir
transformation [9] but the security now relies on the random oracle model.
We compares our work with the related schemes in functionalities and effi-
ciency. The schemes in [12,13,14] are similar with ours in functionalities except
that the receivers in their schemes cannot be traced in the case of dispute.
In efficiency, their schemes suffer from a linear overhead related to the group
size while our scheme requires only a constant overhead. The group encryption
scheme [11] achieves similar security goals but is less efficient. Note that the
schemes in [12,13,14] can all be seen as an analog of (threshold) ring signatures
in the encryption context and hence fall into one category. The scheme in [14]
relies on the cut-and-choose method in zero-knowledge and is less efficient. The
scheme in [12] improves the scheme in [14]. It is non-interactive and does not
depend on the cut-and-choose method. The scheme in [13] is a threshold version
of [12]. Hence, we only compare our scheme with [11] and [12] for clarity. The
detailed comparison is given in the following table.
In the above table, ROM represents the random oracle model. λN ≥ 1024
and λp ≥ 171 are security parameters. E and P denote exponentiation
operation and pairing map, respectively. Note that we do not differentiate a
Table 1. Comparison of related schemes
Comp. Length Interaction Trace Security Assumptions
[12] (20n + 2)Es ≈ (16n + 2)λN No No ROM Standard
[11] 90Es ≈ 75λN Yes Yes Standard Non-standard
Ours 16Ps+18Es ≈ 12λp No Yes ROM Standard
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multi-exponentiation (or multi-pairing) with a single exponentiation (or a single
pairing) as they have similar complexity [7]. Both our scheme and the schemes in
[12,13] depend on a random oracle model. The security proof of [11] uses a stan-
dard model but it relies on non-standard computational assumptions. Table 1
shows that our scheme is more efficient than those in [11,12].
2 Modeling Group Decryption
In this section, we formalize the notion of the group decryption. It allows a
sender to verifiably encrypt a committed message to any group member while
the intended recipient remains anonymous. In the case of dispute, the anonymity
can be verifiably revoked by the group manager.
2.1 Group Decryption Algorithms
A group decryption (GD) scheme involves four parties, a group manager who
administers the group and traces the recipients when necessary, a group of reg-
istered members who anonymously receive messages from senders, a sender who
might be one of the group members or an outsider and has secret messages to be
sent to the registered members, and a verifier who can verify the GD protocol
without secret inputs. A GD scheme consists of the following procedures.
– ParaGen: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a security
parameter λ, outputs the system-wide parameter π.
– GKeyGen: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input the system
parameter π, outputs the group public and secret key pair (gpk, gsk).
– UKeyGen: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input the sys-
tem parameter π, outputs a user’s public and secret key pair (upk, usk). It
outputs independent key pairs in different runs with the same input π.
– Join: It is a polynomial time interactive algorithm between a user U who
wants to join a group and the group manager GM. U has input usk while
GM has input gsk. The common input is (π, gpk, upk). The user has outputs
(mpk,msk) which are the public and secret key pair of U as a legitimate
group member. GM outputs an updated local database which includes a
tracing trapdoor TU corresponding to the group member U . The tracing
trapdoors form a tracing list LT secretly maintained by the group manager.
TU and TU ′ may be identical or not for U = U ′. All the legitimate group
members’ public keys {mpk} form a public key list Lpk.
– Encrypt: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a secret
message m in the structured message space, the intended group members’s
public key mpk in the public key list and the system parameter π, outputs
a ciphertext c in the ciphertext space.
– EnVerify: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a ciphertext
c, the system parameter π, the group public key gpk and the public key
list of the group members, outputs a bit 1 or 0 to represent whether the
ciphertext is valid or not.
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– Decryption: It is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a valid
ciphertext c, the system parameter π, the intended group member U ’s public
key mpk and secret key msk, outputs a message m in the message space.
– Trace: It is a polynomial time interactive algorithm between the group man-
ager GM and a verifier. The group manager and the verifier have common
inputs (π, gpk, Lpk, c), where c is a valid ciphertext defined by the encryption
procedure. The group manager has secret inputs (gsk, LT ). After the inter-
active algorithm is run, the manager GM outputs mpk which represents the
identity of the intended recipient of c and completes a zero-knowledge proof
that the recipient has been traced correctly, while the verifier outputs a bit
1 or 0 to represent that the Trace procedure has been correctly run or not.
A GD scheme is said to be correct if all the parties follow the scheme honestly,
the EnVerify algorithm outputs 1, the Decryption algorithm outputs the correct
message and the verifier in the Trace procedure outputs 1.
2.2 Adversarial Model
We model the adversaries in GD schemes with the following oracles to which the
adversaries can query. These oracles are maintained by a challenger.
– UKeyGen Oracle. For the i-th (i > 0) query, the adversary queries this oracle
with an integer i. The challenger responds with the i-th user’s public key
upki but keeps the corresponding secret key uski. The challenger maintains
a counter n to record the query times and updates n = i.
– Join Oracle. The adversary queries this oracle with upki which is an output
of the UKeyGen. The challenger runs the Join procedure for (upki, uski). The
transcript of this procedure and the corresponding group member public key
mpki are sent to the adversary. The challenger updates the corresponding
tracing list as the real scheme.
– Corruption Oracle. The adversary queries with mpki and obtains the corre-
sponding secret key mski if mpki is in the group member public key list.
– Encryption Oracle. The adversary queries this oracle with (m,mpki), where
m is a message in the message space and mpki is in the group member public
key list. The challenger responds with the corresponding ciphertext c.
– Decryption Oracle. The adversary queries this oracle with a valid ciphertext
for decryption. The challenger responds with the corresponding message.
– Trace Oracle. The adversary queries this oracle with a valid ciphertext. The
challenger responds with the identity of the traced recipient and a proof to
show that the ciphertext was sent to the traced recipient.
2.3 Security Definitions
We first consider the semantic security against chosen-chiphertext attacks. It
states that the attacker cannot get any information of the encrypted message
by accessing all the above oracles, including the decryption procedure provided
Publicly Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Group Decryption 77
that the secret key of the intended recipient and the target ciphertext were not
queried. More formally, it is defined by the following game between a challenger
CH and an adversary A.
Setup: CH runs ParaGen and GkeyGen algorithms to generate the system pa-
rameters π and the group public and secret key pair (gpk, gsk). (π, gpk)
are sent to the attacker A. CH also initializes a counter and three lists
LU , LM , LT to record the users, the group members, and the tracing trap-
doors.
Phase 1: A can adaptively make all the oracles defined above.
Challenge: A chooses a tuple (m0,m1,mpki), where m0,m1 are in the mes-
sage space and mpki ∈ Lpk was never queried to the Corruption oracle.
CH randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs the challenge ciphertext
c∗ =Encrypt(π,mpki,mb). CH sends c∗ to A.
Phase 2: A may make another sequence of queries as in Phase 1 with a con-
straint that the Corruption oracle cannot be queried on mpki and c∗ cannot
be queried to the Decrypt oracle.
Output: Finally A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins if b′ = b. The
advantage of A is defined as |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |.
Definition 1. We say that a GD scheme is semantically secure against cho-
sen ciphertext attacks if no polynomially bounded adversary has non-negligible
advantage in the above game.
The anonymity states that the attacker cannot determine the intended recipient
of a ciphertext with a probability non-negligible greater than the probability of
a random guess, provided that the attacker did not query the Trace oracle or
the receivers’ secret keys to the Corruption oracle. Note that the attacker can
choose the message to be encrypted. Formally, the anonymity is defined by the
following game between a challenger CH and an adversary A.
Setup: It is the same as the semantic security game.
Phase 1: A can adaptively make all the oracles defined above.
Challenge: A chooses a tuple (m,mpki0 ,mpki1), where mpki0 ,mpki1 ∈ Lpk
were never queried to the Corruption oracle and m is in the message space.
CH randomly selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and outputs the challenge ciphertext
c∗ =Encrypt(π,mpkib ,m). CH sends c∗ to A.
Phase 2: A may make another sequence of queries as in Phase 1 except that
the Corruption oracle cannot be queried on mpki0 ,mpki1 and c∗ cannot be
queried to the Trace oracle.
Output: Finally A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins if b′ = b. The
advantage of A is defined as |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |.
Definition 2. We say that a GD scheme is anonymous if no polynomially
bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
A GD scheme should allow to revoke the identity of the recipient’s identity in
the case of dispute. The traceability of a GD scheme is defined by the following
game between a challenger CH and an adversary A.
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Setup: It is the same as the semantic security game.
Probe Phase: A can adaptively make queries to all the oracles defined above.
Output: A outputs a valid ciphertext c∗. A wins if CH cannot output the
identity of the recipient in the member list or provide a valid zero-knowledge
proof of the traced identity accepted by an honesty verifier.
Definition 3. We say that a group decryption scheme is traceable if no polyno-
mially bounded adversary has non-negligible probability to win the above game.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Bilinear Pairings
The implementation of our scheme requires the bilinear pairing techniques [18].
Let PGen be an algorithm that, on input a security parameter 1λ, outputs a tuple
Υ = (p, G1, G2, G3, g1, g2, e), where G1 = 〈g1〉 and G2 = 〈g2〉 have the same
prime order p. e : G1 × G2 → G3 is an efficient bilinear map if it holds that
e(g1, g2) = 1 and for all h1 ∈ G1, h2 ∈ G2 and u, v ∈ Z, e(hu1 , hv2) = e(h1, h2)uv.
There are three types of pairing groups [10]: (1) G2 = G1. (2) G2 = G1
in which there is an efficient distortion map ψ : G2 → G1 but there is no
efficient distortion map ϕ : G1 → G2, where the distortion map satisfies ψ(gu2 ) =
ψ(g2)u ∈ G1 for any u ∈ Zp. (3) G2 = G1 but there is no efficient distortion
map ψ : G2 → G1 or ϕ : G1 → G2.
3.2 Computational Assumptions
Suppose that Υ = (p,G1,G2,G3, g1, g2, e)← PGen(1λ) are pairing groups, where
G1, G2, and G3 are public. Our proposals are based on the following assump-
tions about pairing groups. We recall that these assumptions have been used by
previous works in the literature [1,2,4,15].
Assumption 1 (Inverse of Bilinear Pairing (IBP) Assumption). Given
a random value A ∈ G2, for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
A, the probability to compute X ∈ G1 satisfying e(X, g2) = A is negligible in λ.
The IBP assumption is weaker than the co-CDH assumption [4]: Given g2,
ga2 ∈ G2 and h ∈ G1,compute ha ∈ G1. An adversary A breaking the IBP as-
sumption can be efficiently converted into an adversary B to break the co-CDH
assumption. The transformation is trivial: Given a co-CDH challenge
(g1, g2, gu1 , g
v
2), B computes A = e(gu1 , gv2) = e(g1, g2)uv and queries A with
(A, g1, g2). B straightforward uses A’s reply X = guv1 to answer the co-CDH
challenge. Similarly, if G1 = G2, the IBP assumption is implied by the classical
CDH assumption in the case G = G1 = G2.
The IBP assumption is an analog of the RSA assumption in the pairing group
settings. We will use a strong version of the IBP assumption which can be viewed
as an analog of the strong RSA assumption in the pairing group settings. This
assumption holds only in the SXDH (symmetric external Diffie-Hellman) pairing
groups (Type 3).
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Assumption 2 (Strong Inverse of Bilinear Pairing (SIBP) Assump-
tion). Let Υ be pairing groups of Type 3. Given a random value h2 ∈ G2, for
any PPT adversary A, the probability to compute a pair (X,Y ) ∈ G21 satisfying
e(X, g2) = e(Y, h2) is negligible in λ.
In pairing groups of type 3, the conventional DDH assumption holds in both
G1 and G2. Hence, such pairing groups are also called SXDH pairing groups [2].
In [2], Ateniese et al. exploited such pairing groups to built their practical group
signatures without random oracles.
Assumption 3 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) Assump-
tion). Let Υ be pairing groups of Type 3. The SXDH assumption states that the
standard DDH assumption holds in both G1 and G2.
The LRSW assumption is a discrete-logarithm assumption originally intro-
duced by Lysyanskaya et al. [15] and used in many subsequent works. Let G
be a cyclic group with generator g and of order | G |. Let gx and gy be given.
Furthermore, assume that an oracle can be called that answers a query s by
a triple(a, asy, ax+sxy), where a=gz is a random group element of G. Let this
oracle be called for s1, s2, . . .. Then, the problem is to generate a quadruple (t,
b, bty, bx+txy), where t /∈ {0, s1, s2, . . .}. Recently, a stronger form of the LRSW
assumption, called Strong LRSW, was introduced by Ateniese et al. [1]. Strong
LRSW only holds in SXDH pairing groups.
Assumption 4 (Strong LRSW Assumption). For SXDH pairing groups
Υ = (p, G1, G2, G3, g1, g2, e) ←PGen(1λ), Let X,Y ∈ G2 be chosen at random,
and OX,Y (·) be an oracle that takes as input a value v ∈ Z∗p, and outputs an
LRSW-tuple (a, ax, ay+vxy) for a random a ∈ G1. Then for any PPT adversary









(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)← AOX,Y (·)(g1, g2, X, Y )
∧a1 ∈ G1 ∧ a2 = au1 ∧ a3 = ax1





where Q is the set of queries A makes to OX,Y (·).
4 Proposed Group Decryption Scheme
We propose a GD scheme following the definition. Currently and independently,
Kiayias et al. [11] presented a primitive called group encryption to achieve the
same security goals as ours. We refer to this primitive as group decryption to
stress the anonymity on the receiver’s side. Our implementation requires a num-
ber of knowledge signatures in pairing groups which can be found in the full
version of the paper [16].
– ParaGen: Let Υ = (p,G1,G2,G3, g1, g2, e) ← PGen(1λ) be pairing groups
of Type 3. H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Zp is a cryptographic hash function. Let h2 be
an independent generator of G2. The global parameter set is π = {Υ,H, h2}.
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This procedure is to generate the system parameters. It can be done by a
trusted third-party or the group manager in a verifiable manner. This is
possible as this procedures requires no secret inputs. That is, all the inputs
to generate the system parameters can be published to enable any one to
verify the execution of ParaGen.
– GKeyGen: This procedure is to generate the group key and run by the
group manager. Randomly select x, y in Z∗p. Compute X = g
x
2 , Y = g
y
2 . The
public and secret keys of the group manager are gpk = (X,Y ), gsk = (x, y).
– UKeyGen: This procedure is to generate the users’ keys and run by each
group user. Some of these users may join the group in the Join stage. Choose
at random u in Z∗p. Compute U = e(g1, g2)
u. The public and secret keys of
the user are upk = U, usk = u.
– Join: A user U can join a group and become a group member via the fol-
lowing protocol with the group manager GM.
1. U sends E = gu1 , T = gu2 to GM via a (an Ind-CCA2) confidential channel
and proves the knowledge of the decryption key:  = PK{u|E = gu1 }.
Since T is used as the tracing trapdoor for the group manager, it cannot
be obtained by anyone except GM. Note that the DDH problem is easy
in G and E has to be keep confidential to attackers to meet anonymity.
Hence, a confidential channel is required to transfer E, T .
2. This procedure is to generate the member certificate for legitimate mem-
bers. GM checks the validity of  and e(E, g2) = e(g1, T ) = U . If any
check fails or T has been in its local database, GM aborts the Join proto-
col. Else, GM blindly generates a CL+-signature S = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)
on the user’s secret key u corresponding to the public key U = e(g1, g2)u,
where a1 = g
γ
1 , a2 = E
γ , a3 = ax1 , a4 = ax2 , a5 = (a1a4)y for a randomly
chosen value γ ← Z∗p. GM sends S = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) to U as its group
certificate corresponding to U , where the secret key is hidden in the form
a2 = au1 . GM adds (T, U) to its local database.
3. The registering user shows that he/she is the owner of the member cer-
tificate and complete his/her member public key in this step. The user
checks that the group certificate S = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) is a valid CL+-
signature [1]: e(a1, X) = e(a3, g2), e(a2, X) = e(a4, g2), e(a1a4, Y ) =
e(a5, g2). If any equation does not hold, the Join protocol fails. Else, the
user computes a knowledge signature σ = KS{u, T |e(a1, T ) = e(a2, g2)∧
e(g1, T ) = U ∧au1 = a2}(gpk||upk||S) on a message containing the group
public key, the user’s own public key and the corresponding certificate.
Here, a knowledge signature σ = KS{x|y = f(x)}(m) denotes a signa-
ture σ of message m showing the knowledge of x such that y = f(x).
The user U who has become a group member obtains its member public
key mpk = {S,U, σ} and secret key msk = u.
– Encryption: Let a sender want to send a committed message m ∈ G1 to a
group member U . It can verifiably send it to U without leaking the identity
of U as follows.
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1. Membership check: The sender verifies the validity of S and σ. If any
check fails, the sender aborts. This procedure is to convince the sender
that its intended receiver is a registered group member.
2. Message commitment: For m ∈ G1, commit the secret message m by
randomly choosing δ ← G1 and computing c0 = e(m, g2)e(δ, h2).
3. Key Re-randomization: Randomly select r ← Z∗p and randomize the group
certificate of U by computing c1 = ar1, c2 = a
r
2, c3 = a
r
3, c4 = a
r
4, c5 = a
r
5.
4. Message encryption: Randomly choose s ← Z∗p, compute c6 = as1, c7 =
m−1as2.
5. Encryption proof: Prove that (c0, c6, c7) has been correctly generated by
compute the knowledge signature c8=KS{M, s|e(c7, g2)c0=e(M, g2)e(δ,
h2)∧c6 = as1∧M = as2}(c0||c1|| · · · ||c7), which is equivalent to the follow-
ing knowledge signature: c′8 = KS{m, s|c0 = e(m, g2)e(δ, h2)∧ c6 = as1 ∧
c7 = m−1as2}(c0||c1|| · · · ||c7). Output c = (c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8)
as the resulting ciphertext of message m.
– Encryption Verification: Any verifier can verify the validity of the cipher-
text as follows:
1. Check that e(c1, X)=e(c3, g2), e(c2, X)=e(c4, g2), e(c1c4, Y )=e(c5, g2).
2. Check that c8 is a valid knowledge signature as defined.
If any check fails, the ciphertext is rejected. Else it is accepted.
– Decryption: The group member U with a secret key u decrypts a ciphertext
c as follows:
1. Check that c2 = cu1 to decide whether the ciphertext is intended to U .
2. Check that validity of the CL+-signature by the equalities e(c3, g2) =
e(c1, X), e(c4, g2) = e(c2, X), e(c5, g2) = e(c1c4, Y ). This check validates
that the intended recipient is a registered group member.
3. Check that c8 is a valid knowledge signature to validate that the cipherx-
text is computed from the committed message.
If any check fails, the group member U aborts the Decryption procedure.
Else, it outputs message m = cu6/c7.
– Receiver Tracing: The group manager can trace the recipient as fol-
lows. It checks whether there exists (T,U) in its local database such that
e(c1, T ) = e(c2, g2). If so, the group manager outputs U . Else it outputs
an error message. The group manager can prove to a verifier that the re-
cipient has been correctly traced with the following zero-knowledge proof
PK{T |e(c1, T ) = e(c2, g2) ∧ e(g1, T ) = U}.
The correctness of the scheme follows from a straightforward verification. For
the security, we have the following claims. The proofs are given in the full version
of the paper [16].
Theorem 1. The proposed GD scheme is semantically secure against chosen
ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model under the DDH assumption and
the Strong LRSW assumption in SXDH pairing groups.
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Theorem 2. The proposed GD scheme is anonymous in the random oracle
model under the DDH assumption and the Strong LRSW assumption in SXDH
pairing groups.
Theorem 3. The proposed GD scheme is traceable in the random oracle model
under the Strong LRSW assumption in SXDH pairing groups.
Since we use the traditional Fiat-Shamir transformation to convert the required
interactive zero-knowledge proofs into knowledge signatures, our security proofs
rely on the random oracle model. However, one may note that a recent result [6]
on the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be applied to our scheme to remove the
random oracle. Following [6], the signer (i.e., the sender or the group manger
in our scheme) has a primary public key matching primary secret key. Each
time it wants to produce a knowledge signature, it generates a fresh pair of
secondary public and secret keys and produces the signature as a function of
these variables, the primary keys and the message. Verification requires not only
the primary public key but also the secondary one associated to the message.
Security requires that it be computationally infeasible to forge a relation between
the primary public key and any secondary public key that was generated by the
signer, even under a chosen-message attack.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we formalized the notion of GD schemes. It allows a sender to
verifiably encrypt a committed message intended to any group member. The
recipient of the ciphertext remains anonymous. The group manager can verifiably
open the identity of the recipient if necessary. We proposed the first GD scheme
from pairing groups secure in the random oracle model, but it can improved
to be secure in the standard model using a recent result [6]. Our scheme has
constant complexity in both computation and the communication.
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